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This chapter explores the electronic monitoring (EM) of homecare work in 
the UK in terms of its impact upon care workers and the employment 
relationship. It considers the rationale for the use of EM and how far EM 
is designed to protect workers (Ball 2010) and service users, but may, in 
the context of the local authority commissioning process, involve not only 
the surveillance of workers but also the reconﬁguration of paid and unpaid 
working time. This reconﬁguration can redeﬁne homecare workers’ labour 
in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Commissioning on the basis of 
‘client contact only payments’ (where providers are paid only for the time 
that care workers are in the service-user’s home) excises so-called 
‘unproductive’ labour and undermines worker autonomy and discretion, but 
also the relational aspects of care. 
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Homecare workers provide personal care to older and disabled people 
in their own homes. The scaling back of state-funded support and the 
marketisation or refamiliarisation of welfare provision has involved 
shifting the workforce from the public to the private sector (Dominelli and 
Hoogvelt 1996; Ungerson and Yeandle 2007). Whilst once delivered 
directly by local authorities, homecare is now overwhelmingly commis- 
sioned and, at the time of writing, was deemed to be in crisis with public 
spending on adult social care set to fall to less than 1% of GDP (Kings 
Fund 2016; UKHCA 2015).
1
 Budgetary pressures on the commission- ing 
of care have produced measures designed to increase productivity through 
reduced costs and intensiﬁed labour. The homecare sector is highly gender 
segregated and characterised by the employment of workers on zero-hours 
contracts (ZHCs); in 2016 it was calculated that 58% of homecare workers 
were on ZHCs (Skills For Care 2016). Under ZHCs there is no obligation 
upon the employer to provide work or on the worker to accept work, 
accordingly both working time and pay are unpredictable (Adams and 
Deakin 2014). ZHCs reflect employer pref- erences for work-on-demand 
scheduling (Jacobs and Padavic 2015) which they argue is justiﬁed by the 
signiﬁcant weekly fluctuations in demand for care. Homecare is further 
marked by the non-payment (or inadequate recognition of) travel time 
between care visits (estimated by the UK Homecare Association at 19% 
of homecare workers’ time) and by episodic or intermittent working 
(Supiot 2001) in the form of unpaid gaps or ‘waiting time’ between visits 
and indeed ZHCs facilitate this unpaid labour. 
It is important to note the gendered history of homecare which pro- 
vides the context for what might be seen as the restoration of women’s 
unpaid care work. Homecare was only established as formal employment 
from the 1970s, with regular ﬁxed hours, written contracts, employment 
security, access to an occupational pension and latterly to equal pay, along 
with paid training and supervision (Dexter and Harbart 1983). Since the 
demand for homecare peaks at certain times during the day (mornings, 
lunchtimes, evenings and bedtimes) so-called ‘down time’— when 
demand is reduced—has been seen as problematic and as an 
unnecessary ‘cost’ for homecare services. It is this so-called paid ‘down-
time’ between homecare visits that has been removed in the 
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transfer of homecare workers from direct employment by the local 
authority to the private sector. ZHCs have provided the contractual basis 
for the removal of ‘down time’ and accommodated fluctuations in local 
authority demand for homecare. 
Private providers are increasingly required by local authorities to use 
EM systems to track the real-time location of homecare workers. Time 
sheets are replaced by integrated computer–telephone technology to 
record service user visits. Logging in and out may be done through service-
users’ telephones (as in the case studies discussed here), but homecare 
workers may also swipe tags on clients’ ﬁles with smartphones or use 
mobile telephones with GPS technology. The system matches the care 
worker's unique number to the database of service users at the EM 
supplier’s call processing centre, logging the time the call was made and 
aligning this to the roster/schedule of care—the care worker repeats the 
procedure when leaving. 
EM has been marketed as a protection for service users and workers but 
as Rosenbat et al. write ‘the line between workplace surveillance as 
coercive and protective/performance-enhancing is in constant tension in 
labor relations, especially as work shifts beyond a speciﬁc, bounded 
location and spills over into a multiplicity of spaces and sites that are 
neither entirely private nor explicitly the purview of employers’ (2014:14). 
Whilst Himmelweit (2005) suggested that there have been difﬁculties in 
increasing productivity in care, EM introduces a new level of managerial 
control into an occupation where previously, because of its location, 
managers had only limited remit and attendance was certiﬁed by the 
service-user (Dexter and Harbart 1983). In fact, EM may substitute for the 
costs of supervision and management, which are not fully funded by local 
authority contracts. Many homecare workers rarely see a super- visor or 
manager or colleague and receive their rotas via mobile telephone. EM in 
homecare has the potential, as Levy proposes for drivers in logistics, to 
abstract labour from its local and biophysical contexts operationalising job 
performance as a set of metrics governable by remote parties. The context 
of work is redeﬁned to legitimate certain types of experience and 
knowledge and to create new meanings and social orders (2015). In its 
reduction of the ‘care package’ (a description suggesting a commodity 
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rather than a relationship) to a series of tasks and number of minutes, EM 
may threaten the relational aspects of homecare and undermine the dis- 
cretionary effort that sustains it. The legacy of gendered domestic labour 
has underpinned the notion of discretionary labour in care work. For 
Glucksmann and Lyon ‘care is signiﬁcant as an activity that is simulta- 
neously work and non-work’ (2006). These arguments have been used to 
explain reliance on discretionary effort in care work suggesting that care 
does not ﬁt well within established labour process mechanisms as a 
commodity for exchange (Bolton and Wibberley 2014). Rubery et al. 
argue that current HR practice relies upon care worker ‘goodwill’ since the 
structure of the homecare market hampers the potential for effective HR 
strategy to alleviate inadequate wages and high levels of staff turnover at 
the level of the individual ﬁrm (2015). 
Brown and Korcynski’s research on the impact of EM in public sector 
homecare services found that whilst labour was intensiﬁed it did not reduce 
discretionary effort (2010). However, their workplace survey involved 
homecare workers directly employed by the local authority, EM had not 
so far affected their working time or income, suggesting the importance of 
the wider context in considering how technology shapes the labour 
process, including social relationships (Prichard et al. 2014; Ball 2010). 
However, Rubery et al.’s 3-year study of the recruitment and retention of 
the wider social care workforce in the public and private sector 
(commissioned by the Department of Health between 2007 and 2010), 
anticipated that EM in homecare could reduce pay by ‘restricting paid 
work time, to time actually spent in people’s houses’ (2011)—this chapter 
takes this proposition as its starting point. 
The chapter is based upon case studies of homecare commissioning, 
encompassing the perspectives of EM suppliers, local authority com- 
missioners, care providers and the experience of care workers. It captures 
variation in the use of EM between local authorities committed to ethical 
homecare and those authorities paying for care on the basis of contact time 
only or minute-by-minute commissioning. Such variation reflects the 
tension between the rhetoric of worker safety and workplace surveillance 
as coercive (Roseblat et al. 2014). The case studies show that whilst the 
narrative underpinning the use of EM is its facility to ensure compliance 
and to safeguard service-users and care workers, it is also 
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being used to instigate local authority savings by delineating paid and 
unpaid working time, with ZHCs providing the contractual basis for the 
removal of so-called ‘unproductive’ work from the remit of paid labour. 
The chapter privileges the voices of care workers who perceive EM as an 
attack on their autonomy and discretion and as involving the degradation 
of their work. 
 
Research Methods 
 
The study draws upon a number of case studies of the local authority 
commissioning of homecare. Primarily, it is based upon case studies of 
two neighbouring local authorities (Authority A and Authority B) in the 
South West of England between 2014 and 2015 and particularly, the 
recommissioning of homecare in one of them. This research was funded 
by a British Academy/Leverhulme small grant and sought to explore the 
impact of electronic monitoring on wages, hours and the employment 
experiences of homecare workers. These case studies were selected 
because of the proximity (at the time) of the researchers and access to key 
local actors. This study is supplemented by more recent research in 2016 
on the implementation of UNISON’s Ethical Care Charter based upon nine 
case studies, including seven local authorities that had adopted the Charter. 
These case studies considered whether and how EM was used in the 
provision of homecare, but particularly, in authorities that were committed 
to improving pay and conditions for care workers. 
The case study method facilitated a combination of data collection 
methods from a variety of sources (Dooley 2002). The role of EM in the 
commissioning process was captured by textual analysis of supporting 
documentation in the form of commissioning strategies, consultations, 
tender documents, along with sales and publicity material for a large 
supplier of EM systems. The perspective of the technology supplier and 
technology design is advocated by Collin-Jacques and Smith (2005) and 
illuminates possible rationales for the adoption of EM. The South West 
case studies involved interviews with two representatives of the supplier 
of electronic monitoring software and systems; seven in-depth interviews 
with six local authority ofﬁcers involved in the commissioning of 
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homecare services and service management; ﬁve interviews with senior 
managers or owners of three homecare providers; plus 14 in-depth 
interviews with female homecare workers working for different homecare 
providers and with experiences of EM in the area covered by the local 
authorities. Since the recommissioning process in one authority was 
prolonged and encountered difﬁculties, the research took on a longitu- 
dinal perspective with reinterviews with commissioners and providers to 
capture the tendering process and its outcomes. The UNISON case studies 
were similarly based upon interviews with 18 local authority 
commissioning or service managers, nine providers, 11 care workers and 
13 UNISON representatives. All interviews were face-to-face, based upon 
informed consent and recorded and transcribed. The authorities are 
anonymised to ensure that respondents cannot be identiﬁed. 
Whilst case studies are not representative, the comparison of local 
authorities subject to the same national budgetary pressures is instructive 
in capturing the scope for variation in the adoption and application of 
tendering requirements including EM. Triangulation was achieved through 
analysis of EM in the homecare strategies of a range of local authorities 
found on the web which conﬁrmed the use and rationale for EM. Micro-
level textual analysis pinpoints the discursive construction of EM in 
marketing and publicity material as well as in council documen- tation, 
which articulates a purported rationale for the implementation of EM 
systems. Critical discourse analysis of both interview and docu- 
mentary texts (Roper et al. 2010) captured dissonance between theory and 
practice, particularly, in the discussion of budgetary issues. Social and 
political contextualisation was brought by macro-analysis of the wider 
socio–political practices evoking the political economy of care. This 
context was informed by previous research on the way ZHCs reconﬁgured 
paid working time and a desire to understand how the introduction of EM 
would affect this trend (Bessa et al. 2013; Low Pay Commission 2013). 
The reporting of extensive interviews with care workers and the local 
authority ofﬁcers and providers that mediate its use is designed to privilege 
subjectivity and supports the widespread use of the actors’ own words 
below. This is important since, as Zuriek puts it, the subject of surveil- 
lance on exposure to the observing gaze is dissolved and ‘reconstituted in 
the abstract’ through performance metrics (Zureik 2003: 39). 
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 Electronic Monitoring in Care 
 
EM is used to track missed, late and over-running visits, but also where 
scheduled visits are cut short. The real-time data is visible to the homecare 
worker’s employer and, where local authorities require provi- ders to use 
a particular EM system, to local authority ofﬁcers. Here, the authority 
owns the intellectual property rights to all information on the Electronic 
Monitoring System, including care worker data. Ironically whilst local 
authorities no longer directly employ homecare workers, a computer 
screen in a council ofﬁce can identify each worker and their location and 
calculate the costs of the service as they are delivering it. Whilst EM 
allows for the analysis of care visit data, it additionally generates 
invoices directly for payment processing. Related systems provide an 
integrated scheduling, monitoring and ﬁnancial management solution 
which, in the case of one supplier, promises to ‘take worker productivity 
to a new level’ improving the management of work. Electronic Scheduling 
allows providers to allocate the most appropriate care worker for each care 
plan or visit based upon a range of factors including availability, location 
and skill set. 
Authority A had required Framework providers to adopt EM since 
2008. Authority B had previously only expected larger providers to do so, 
but it was now a requirement under the recommissioning process. 
Commissioning documentation and interviews with local authority rep- 
resentatives drew, often simultaneously, upon three narratives legitimising 
the use of EM: worker and provider compliance; safeguarding for both 
service users and care workers, and cost savings. Local Authority A 
required external providers to use its speciﬁed EM system and stated that 
it had introduced it for a range of reasons including to promote safety for 
lone workers and service users, to improve the quality and visibility of the 
service, to reduce administration costs and to ensure invoices from pro- 
viders were linked to actual hours of care commissioned and delivered. 
In terms of safeguarding local authorities and suppliers emphasised that 
EM can protect workers from service-users’ complaints that they had not 
turned up or were late or left early, as a Commissioning Ofﬁcer in 
Authority A stated: 
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The other thing that EM has done for us is it’s been very useful with 
safeguarding and it’s been useful for complaints. So if we have complaints 
where people say the care worker’s not turning up and the providers say 
actually they are, we’re able to check that. And we’re able to check visit 
times where safeguarding is an issue. For example, we’ve had instances 
whereby there’s been an issue of neglect, perhaps somebody has not been 
given medication, perhaps quite serious medication that they need. So we’re 
able to check on EM whether staff were there and clearly what we’re not 
able not to do with EM is to check that people have had their medication, 
but we can at least check that people are there. 
 
For Rosenblat et al. the rhetoric of safety may be one justiﬁcation for 
surveillance technologies, ‘although safekeeping is seldom their sole 
purpose or effect’ (2014: 3). Publicity material for the leading supplier of 
EM technology states it is designed to improve efﬁciency and quality 
assurance in homecare. Whilst safeguarding service users and staff, the 
supplier also promises ﬁnancial beneﬁts and EM has been promoted on the 
basis of signiﬁcant savings. For local authorities the system offers a three-
way analysis of commissioned (purchased) time, versus planned 
(scheduled) time, versus actual or delivered time so that providers may be 
paid only for ‘contact time’ with service users. As a marketing manager 
explained this means authorities no longer pay for the time between actual 
and scheduled visits, discouraging shortened visits that might be the result 
of call-cramming (back-to-back visits): 
 
What’s commissioned compared with what’s planned, compared with 
what’s actually delivered, is totally different. The difference between 
commissioned and planned quite often is somewhere between 10 and 20 
per cent. So quite often the planned package once it goes out to an external 
provider will be somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent different from what 
was commissioned largely based on the ability of the care provider to 
actually deliver for that service user based on all the other business that 
they have to manage. And that’s understood within the market to be a key 
dynamic. However, then what’s actually delivered will depend on how 
effective the provider is at actually planning the time of their care workers 
and all the issues in the market, things like not allowing for travel time, 
call-cramming as a result of that. With the best will in the world, 
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and allowing as much time as you possibly could to run a commercial 
business and still make a reasonable proﬁt, visits do start to run late once 
you get to the back end of the day. And as a result of that, the half an hour 
visit often becomes an 18 minute visit or a 20 minute visit. The difference 
between commissioned and actual delivery can be anything up to 40 per 
cent difference. And that’s really why a lot of councils, and we came back 
to drivers, for many councils it was about making sure that they were only 
paying for the care that was delivered once they’d outsourced the bulk of 
their home care to the external provision. 
 
The EM supplier in question reported working with 65 local authorities 
and publicity material conﬁrmed direct cost savings between organisa- 
tions paying on commissioned time and those monitoring and paying on 
actual delivery of upwards of 37%. The UK Home Care Association 
(UKHCA), which represents homecare providers, notes that with very few 
exceptions councils pay providers by reference to ‘contact time’ only, 
leaving the provider to meet the full costs of the service and placing severe 
pressures on the payment of all working time including travel and training 
and supervision costs. The UKHCA believes this is a universal practice to 
reduce the transactional costs of invoice processing for councils (2015: 
15). 
It was reported that in Local Authority A, since it had begun paying 
providers for only the care delivered, it had made 10% savings in its Adult 
Social Care purchasing budget. Its Framework Agreement obliges 
providers to transfer rostering information ﬁve days in advance to the 
council’s system. Invoices are produced from the EM and are paid only if 
they are submitted via EM (in exceptions the provider is charged by the 
council for processing invoices). Payments are made where the total visit 
time is within the parameters deﬁned by the council, where they are in 
excess of this time there is an investigation by council ofﬁcers, but 
payment will not be authorised where they consider variation to be outside 
the agreed requirements and providers are instructed not to provide visits 
in excess of contractual arrangements without authorisation by the Council 
contracts team. The Council commissions in half hour bands as a minimum 
and then 15 minute blocks after that. A care worker reported on the 
implications of the banding system: 
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You’d be out on say like £8 an hour, and if you were in there quarter of an 
hour out of a half hour duty, then you’d only get quarter of an hour. If you 
were there 20 minutes, you wouldn’t get 20 minutes pay, you’d still get your 
quarter of an hour. But if you stayed there 30 minutes, you’d obviously get 
your 30 minutes. They basically rounded it up or rounded it down to the 
nearest quarter of an hour or to the nearest half an hour. So in my eyes they 
were penny pinching. They were trying to save money. That’s why I left 
because I felt I would end up rushing the job instead of actually caring 
about the work and in my eyes that’s not caring. [Careworker6] 
 
The commissioning ofﬁcer for Local Authority B conﬁrmed that, as in 
Local Authority A, the introduction of EM has yielded ﬁnancial beneﬁts 
for the Council: 
 
We’ve had a cost saving since we’ve introduced Electronic Monitoring. 
What we were doing was we were paying providers on what we com- 
missioned. So if we commissioned ‘x’ number of hours, they would then be 
paid for ‘x’ number of hours, what we now do is we pay providers on what 
we call actuals, so the actual time they’ve spent with the service user, 
because we were paying too much, because often what was provided wasn’t 
what was commissioned - perhaps the service user’s needs changed or 
whatever or often it can be the case that they would say to the provider: “I 
don’t want you today because my daughter’s here,” or whatever. There’s a 
legitimate reason for turning the provider away. 
 
The quote demonstrates the contingent nature of homecare and here 
providers and ultimately workers absorb the risk represented by the 
fluctuations in the demand for care, which might (as in the quote) be down 
to changes in service users’ plans, or be as a result of hospitalisation or 
death. In Local Authority A, if a service user is admitted to hospital on an 
emergency basis the provider may charge for the next planned visit within 
24 hours if the provider was unaware of the admission—no further 
charges are made until the service resumes—recommencement of the 
service is required within 24 hours. 
In Local Authority B, the requirement to adopt EM in its recom- 
missioning process involved a move from a banding system, 
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where workers would be paid (as in Authority A) to the nearest 15 minutes, 
to being paid to the minute, as a provider anticipated: 
 
If they do minute-by-minute billing, and that person leaves early, they 
will only get paid their 20 minutes. Whereas at the moment if the girls 
stay over 23 minutes they are paid for a 30 minutes call; so it comes 
into sections of time about how much they get paid and if they stay 22 
minutes they only get paid 15 minutes - there’s a cut-off point. 
 
Whilst EM can be used to ensure that visits are not cut short, in this 
case it was also designed to guard against care workers ‘hanging 
around’ to the cut-off point to make up their pay. The commissioning 
of care on ‘actual’ contact time suggests that any time not spent in the 
engagement of care tasks in the service-user’s home is not productive 
and therefore does not have to be paid for. This includes training, 
management and supervision. It also includes provider overheads and 
another provider reflected upon the downward pressure on cost in the 
retendering exercise on top of the impact of minute-by-minute 
commissioning: 
 
Well they’re saving, if the carers are going in and it’s a 30 minutes call and 
they go in for 20 minutes, they only get paid for the 20 minutes. So in a 
week if that happens, it all adds up doesn’t it, and if you’re doing a lot of 
calls it’s going to add up somewhere along the line isn’t it? You are going 
to have to be much tighter on your scheduling and make sure that you have 
allowed adequate time for everything, travel time, trafﬁc, all even- tualities 
so that that person can be allowed the time that they’ve actually got for that 
person otherwise they are going to lose money. When you think what has 
got to come out of that hourly charge rate it’s frightening – we put in the 
cost of the manager, the cost of the coordinator or two coordinators, the 
cost of senior carers, the cost of an ofﬁce, the cost of the company HR all 
of that – then there’s the IT, the EM system, the expenditure on that – that’s 
all got to come out of the £14.20; the hourly pay rate – the lowest rate is 
£7.45
2
, national insurance, pensions –you try and work out the maths 
because I can’t!! The person from the bid team that was doing it came back 
to me and said: “Are you having a laugh?” And I said, “No, I’m not—that 
is the highest we can bid at.” She said, “You just can’t do it.” The most 
frightening thing about the whole process 
 
s.moore@greenwich.ac.uk 
 
112 S. Moore and L.J.B. Hayes 
 
is the charge rate. They’ve set it and the maximum they’ve set it at is 
£14.20, which is a cut for us. We’re trying to pay our homecare workers a 
living wage, we’re trying to pay appropriate mileage, travel time and on the 
margins that you’ve got on the charge rate that [the local authority] are 
setting you can’t do all of that – it is impossible. 
 
In fact, this provider lost out in the recommissioning process, reporting 
that one of the four successful providers had tendered at £12.20 an hour– 
a rate which the director of the company stated was ‘unviable’ and the exit 
of large providers from the publicly funded care market has been 
documented ADASS (2015). In the case studies of authorities that had 
adopted UNISON’s ECC there was a general rejection of minute-by-
minute commissioning, which was perceived as incompatible with ethical 
care and in particular the payment of a Living Wage and travel time. Here, 
there was acceptance that to deliver the ECC charge rates had to reflect 
these costs and, where the Charter had been suc- cessfully implemented, 
authorities had provided extra investment. Only one of the seven 
authorities paid providers on contact time to the minute. Signiﬁcantly, one 
of its providers reported that it absorbed the difference between contact 
and scheduled time in order to protect care workers’ pay and suggested 
that providers often accommodated such costs to avoid the costs of staff 
turnover. 
ZHCs effectively remove both waiting time between visits and travel 
time from the remit of paid labour, however, since the worker is available 
to the employer during those times the line between paid and unpaid labour 
may be blurred. EM represents a step change as it clearly delineates 
productive and apparently ‘unproductive’ labour time for the purposes of 
pay. One key aspect of this is that workers are penalised for running late, 
whether through call-cramming, the unexpected demands of service users 
or travel difﬁculties. For homecare workers employed by providers in 
Authorities A and B, EM was perceived to have resulted in cuts in pay, 
one said she had lost pay because call-cramming meant she would arrive 
late to visits and was sometimes earning only £120 a fortnight. Another 
care worker recalled that her co-worker had calculated that EM had meant 
a reduction in pay of £50 per week and she described how each visit 
introduced new sources of unpaid time that added up over the day. 
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As other care workers reported, whilst EM meant they would not get paid 
for cutting calls short, they were also not paid where calls overran 
scheduled time because of unforeseen circumstances: 
 
When I started with them there was no clocking in, but that did come into 
play. And if you moaned about not having enough travelling time, they 
would just take those clients off you and then you would have a big gap. 
So you would sit and wait for an hour and a half before your next one or 
an hour. And then they brought the clocking-in time as well, it was 
supposed to allow for travelling time. And on our call sheet it would have 
‘Client 1: Address’ and then they would put a ﬁve minute gap. They said 
that you would have ﬁve minutes to get there. That actually happened for 
about two or three months and then the time sheets were coming back 
normal, just like before, with no travelling time and clients’ time starting in 
the middle of the previous client’s time. You were driving from A to B and 
just manic, dangerous driving because you’re rushing to get there. And then 
the poor clients—because you’re 15 minutes late, and it’s not fair on them—
and then you’ve got to leave on time. So you’re clocking in late because 
you’ve got no travelling time and you’re clocking out on time but only 
getting paid then 15 minutes for a half an hour call. But you are actually 
still working and then, they said to us if we went over our time with a client 
we wouldn’t get paid because that’s not the contracted hours. The council 
won’t pay them, so the agency won’t pay us. So if we did an extra hour, 
which happened quite often if somebody has had a fall or somebody wasn’t 
well, and you stay on because it’s your duty of care, we wouldn’t get paid 
that [Careworker8] 
 
The extent of unpaid labour is underlined by another careworker: 
 
The last shift I did from 7 till 2 I had six calls and I had 3 ¼ hours so 
availability is 7 hours and I got paid 3 ¼. But I had my uniform on 
obviously I couldn’t do anything else. That was a fairly typical day, getting 
paid for about half the time I am available for work. If I had a full day, it 
would be from 7 in the morning till 10 at night and then you probably might 
get 6-7 hours’ pay out of that. [Careworker12] 
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 For Ehrenreich (2001), time and tracking technologies can be used to 
constrain employee attempts to ‘steal’ time from employers and, in the case 
of homecare, this extends to providers. Local Authority B antici- pated 
that the requirement to utilise EM would cut ‘illegitimate’ manual entries 
based upon the commissioned time, since the council could monitor 
centrally on a real-time basis. Whilst there was some acceptance that 
failure to log in and out could be legitimate, there was also suspicion that 
both providers and care workers could manipulate the system as one 
commissioning ofﬁcer commented: 
 
The providers can override the system so, for example, some service users 
would not let the care worker use the phone for whatever reason. And then 
it has to be a manual entry back at the ofﬁce. We just need to be very careful 
about making sure that those manual entries are legitimate. If the care 
worker logs in at a service user’s house then it says how long they’ve been 
and how long they haven’t been there. The ones that are done back at the 
ofﬁce we don’t know whether they’re legitimate or not. We can do spot 
checks with those, what we do is we’ve analysed the providers so we check 
how many are doing the manual entries back at the ofﬁce. And some 
providers will stick out like a sore thumb. 
 
For care workers back-to-back visits (‘call-cramming’) and insufﬁcient 
travel time between them drives them to cut visits short to ensure they get 
to the next service user (‘clipping’); this is further encouraged where travel 
time is not paid in order to minimise the extent of unpaid labour and 
because of the direct relationship between contact time and pay. One 
provider described how care workers may attempt to claw back unpaid 
travel time or paid time lost through call-cramming by cutting visits short: 
 
I think people forget to log-out, and in some cases genuinely. I think other 
cases they’re trying to work the system. So you’ve got a 30 minutes call, 
you might have only stayed 20 minutes but you haven’t logged out so you’re 
at the next client’s. Whereas if they’d have stayed their full 30 minutes—
you can’t be at Gladys’s at twenty past seven when you only got to Bert’s 
at 7, 
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and it’s a 30 minute call. So they’re shortcutting the calls, so it can be 
worked—it can be abused, shall we say, not worked—and, obviously, we 
have to, as providers, clamp down on that and try and address those things. 
I think some of the girls will try and work it so that they’re short- ening 
their calls but trying to get the full 30 minutes. And it’s not helped when 
you’ve got people in that round that either won’t let you use their telephone, 
because we’ve got some people who won’t let you use their phone. Or they 
haven’t got a phone so you can’t always track it as closely as you would 
like to. 
 
Care workers conﬁrmed that service-users could be reluctant to let them 
use their phones, having to be reassured that they would not be charged, 
or that phones might be in use when they needed to clock in or out. Yet, 
in Authority B no payment is made where visits have not been logged 
correctly. Rather than workers stealing time, care workers reported losing 
pay when they forgot to or could not clock in, which was often a result of 
rushing from one call to another: 
As Levy (2015) describes for fleet management systems used to track 
drivers, real-time monitoring removes the ability of workers to recon- 
struct their time, which may be to demonstrate or manufacture com- 
pliance. EM thus undermines informal worker power as well as their 
formal autonomy at work. As one care worker describes, it also removes 
discretion, forcing workers to stay in service users’ homes where they 
judged that they were not needed: 
 
If the house visit was for, say, half an hour, you had to log in when you got 
there, say 12.30, but you weren’t allowed to log out; you had to stay there. 
If I went in for 30 minutes and they didn’t want anything, they just wanted 
a cup of tea, a bit of toast and butter and I was only there 15 minutes, I 
would only have got paid for the 15 minutes. So I had to stay there right up 
until two minutes before I left so that I could get that pay. [Careworker2] 
 
The removal of discretion was particularly felt in the context of the 
contingent and unpredictable nature of homecare work, in the context of 
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variable travel and transport conditions and the vulnerability of service-
users: 
 
You could leave dead on time but they don’t give you any time for 
travelling. You can be stuck in trafﬁc 20 minutes, half an hour but you don’t 
get paid for that. And then they’re questioning you: “Why are you late?” 
And you’ve got trafﬁc lights, you’ll hit trafﬁc, you could be stuck for ages. 
It’s not a case of skiving off anywhere: you’re stuck. Some people can spend 
half an hour on the loo or they could have had an accident where they mess 
themselves and you’ve got to stay there and clean them. You can’t walk 
away. My argument is—which is what I’ve argued with them— you cannot 
walk away from a service user or a client whatever you want to call them, 
if they’ve had the accident where they’ve messed themselves or even if a 
client’s had a fall. I went to a service user who had a fall and I rang an 
ambulance to get the person up and checked out. Then I rang in work 
because I was running really late. [Careworker9] 
 As an ofﬁcer responsible for quality assurance reported homecare workers 
perceived the surveillance of their work as indicating a lack of trust, once 
again drawing upon narratives of safety and service quality to support the 
implementation of EM: 
 
I think at the beginning, some of the care workers found it a bit of a faff; 
felt it was a bit big brother-ish, which you can understand. Also you can 
understand some of them might have felt that it was there because of a lack 
of trust. But I think there’s an understanding that if we are not able to 
monitor then how do we know this won’t happen? In quality assurance, if 
it’s not written down and somebody doesn’t say what’s happening, then it 
hasn’t happened. It’s better for the staff because of the fact that they can 
prove they’ve been there. They can prove they arrived and when they left. 
They can’t prove what they did in between but at least they can prove 
something. I don’t think it’s a way of saving money—that’s my feeling— 
but I work on the quality assurance side. Obviously it could be used, it can 
be used for that, but that’s where people aren’t meeting their business targets 
and what we expect of them in the contract. But that’s not the primary 
function. The primary function is to make sure that people are 
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turning up and reassurance that people are going to turn up on time and 
that something happens if they don’t. 
 
The narratives of care workers do not suggest that employers were able to 
initiate the type of organisational discourses to build trust in technology 
that Prichard et al. identiﬁed as key to mediating the extension of 
managerial control through technology in healthcare call centres (2014: 
821). This may be because of the dispersed nature of the work and 
limitations on managerial time, however, Prichard et al. also found that 
workers were able to exercise some discretion in the operation of the 
technology, lending legitimacy. A care worker suggested her frustration at 
the lack of trust EM intimated, but also that paid work depended upon use 
of the technology: 
 
With the clocking in on the phone, I used to forget to do it a lot of the time. 
I phoned the ofﬁce to say I’ve forgotten to log in, she used to say: “Oh, I’ll 
do it for you,” but if she didn’t I wouldn’t have got paid. And I think it’s 
wrong really because they damn well know you’re there and damn well 
know you’re at work. Because if you’re not there, when you’re supposed to 
be there, that service user would ring the ofﬁce and say that I hadn’t turned 
up today. [Careworker2] 
 
The notion of ‘big brother’ was invoked by a number of respondents, with 
EM generating a palpable sense of the ‘management gaze’ and remote 
signal of control that communicated expectations of compliance 
(Rosenblat et al. 2014), as one provider reported of the workers she 
employed across both authorities: 
 
They don’t like it and we had a huge resistance when it was ﬁrst intro- 
duced. And, in fact, they introduced the electronic monitoring and what 
happened was that it affected the quality, the relationship between the carer 
and the client. It was clock-watching and you hear the “we need to come 
on, get a move on” sort of thing and “I’ve got to get to the next person”. 
Well we don’t have a choice in it, we won’t have any work if we don’t 
comply, the authorities felt that they were paying more, they could pay less. 
It was ﬁnancial. 
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Here, the rationale for EM was identiﬁed as ﬁnancial, with concerns raised 
about its impact on the quality of care shared by a service manager in 
Local Authority A. He refers to ‘the flags’ that come up on the computer 
screen to track the relationship between planned and actual visits and 
which signal non compliance: 
 
I think it was introduced supposedly for quality purposes although my 
personal opinion is that it doesn’t monitor quality. It’s ﬁnance-driven 
actually because before we would pay for what we’d commissioned. So 
now we pay for the actual, so if they were there for 29 minutes we pay for 
29 minutes. For me, the most important thing—what it should do—is be 
able to monitor the difference—so the closeness to what we’ve commis- 
sioned to what’s actually been provided. We actually don’t get a report on 
the difference between commissioned to provided until the invoice stage 
which is actually quite late in the process. So we could have commissioned 
hourly visits but the provider knows that they can’t deliver hourly visits so 
they plan different. And the flags that come up are based on the planned - 
all it does is tells you that somebody turned up, it doesn’t tell you what they 
did. It doesn’t talk about the attitude to the way that they provided care, it 
just tells you that they were in the house for half an hour, they could have 
been sat there. 
 
Care was seen to be reduced to the correct operation of the telephone 
system and to watching the clock, as one worker reported: 
 
I found personally—and loads of other people do think this as well— that 
when you have to clock in and clock out, when you’re in a client’s house to 
do the job, you’re constantly looking at the time. So you’ve got half an hour 
duty to do, you clock in at 10: “Right I’ve got half hour to get out”. And 
that’s what’s going through the carer’s mind. Because you’re not paid if you 
go over your time by ﬁve minutes, you’re only paid half an hour. If you go 
over by 10 minutes you’re paid, I think you’re paid quarter of an hour extra. 
But then they want to know why it’s taken that length of time. Which is ﬁne 
and understandable I suppose, but I felt like it’s big brother watching you. 
They’re rushing all the time. There’s no 
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time for human care if you like, not personal care but the human contact 
care where you can spend time and say; “Are you alright? How you doing?” 
That’s what it’s like. [Careworker 6] 
 
As suggested here, care workers perceived that EM constrained the 
relational aspects of care (Brennan et al. 1999) that are embedded within 
the commodiﬁed care relationship (Ungerson 1999), another care worker 
conﬁrmed this: 
 
I think if you go in and you’ve still got your jacket and you’re still running 
around, you’re not there with them really. You’re just there to feed them 
and give them a hot drink. I always used to go and take me coat off and put 
me bag down and ask if they’re ok ﬁrst. And my trouble is I chat too much 
and, of course, when you’re chatting with them and then you make their 
drink, they don’t want you to go. But you know you’re looking at that clock 
and – the chatting, it’s companionship, it’s deﬁnitely part of care. 
[Careworker2] 
 
Care workers reported returning to clients outside of the EM system to do 
tasks that they had been unable to ﬁnish within paid working time, 
although others were unwilling or unable to engage in such discretionary 
labour. Here, the reduction of care to a series of tasks in the Taylorist 
fashion may undermine the discretionary effort upon which homecare has 
been dependent since EM makes it absolutely clear that it is unpaid work, 
as summed up by a provider: 
 
We have had cases where someone has stayed to have a chat – well, the 
authority aren’t going to pay us for you to stay and have a chat with them, 
that’s your time. Log out of your time and then stay and have a chat if you 
like but you need to go on to your other clients. 
 
This may address Folbre’s question as to whether, in the context of a 
gendered and ethically driven propensity to care, reliance on extrinsic 
rather than intrinsic motivation might affect the quality of care in the 
labour market (2012), with contradictory outcomes for women’s care 
labour. 
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Conclusions 
 
Empowerment and disempowerment are deﬁning features of workplace 
surveillance (Zureik 2003: 66). This account embeds workplace 
surveillance in the employment relationship, demonstrating that EM 
goes beyond the recording of working time (Cockburn and Ormerod 1993) 
and has little potential to empower workers. The case studies of local 
authorities in the south west of England demonstrate that homecare 
workers perceive EM as undermining their autonomy and discretion in 
what is contingent and unpredictable work. They also suggest that it 
damages the relational aspects of care work. The narratives of the care 
workers do not suggest that employers have built trust in EM, but 
articulate their experiences of EM in terms of managerial control and the 
degradation of their work. They make it clear that they understand EM as 
a system which sets limitations on their pay, anchoring paid time within 
service-users’ homes. 
Unpaid work has become embedded in the organisation of homecare; 
in combination, ZHC and EM strip so-called ‘unproductive’ labour 
from care work. ZHCs provide the contractual basis for episodic work 
and the non-payment of travel time—here the relationship between 
paid and unpaid elements of work is unclear because the care 
worker is seemingly available to the employer when not in the service-
user’s home. Bell and Tuckman assert ‘the homogenisation of working 
time’, extending the real subsumption of labour and capital’s 
permeation into free time (2002), with labour increasingly available to 
capital. The line between time expended in ‘labour’ (where labour is 
sold as a commod- ity), and ‘free time’ outside of that contract 
(uncommodiﬁed outside of exchange) is blurred. In these case studies, 
EM delineates, rather than blurs, paid and unpaid labour enforcing a 
spatial and temporal demar- cation between the two whilst 
simultaneously demanding unbounded availability from the care 
worker. EM facilitated the payment of providers for client contact only, 
particularly on a minute-by-minute basis, removing further elements of 
work from the remit of paid labour. Care workers are penalised if they 
overrun on calls because of the contingent nature of service user need 
or if they subsequently run late because of 
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such contingencies or because of call-cramming and insufﬁcient travel 
time. At the same time, they are prevented from leaving before the end of 
scheduled visits even if not needed which, in the absence of paid travel 
time, is the only way they can claw back paid working time. Whilst hourly 
rates for homecare workers may be formally at or above the level of 
statutory minimums (and, in some cases, the Living Wage) an increasing 
proportion of working time is unpaid bringing paid working time below 
these minima. In Marxist terms, EM achieves an increase in the rate of 
relative surplus value through reconﬁguring the ratio of unpaid to paid 
working time and consequently results in an intensiﬁ- cation of work in 
pursuit of higher productivity (Mavroudeas and Ioannides 2011). 
As Zureik maintains the surveillance of work cannot be severed from 
the surrounding political and economic environment (2003). This study of 
EM in homecare is located in the political economy of care, where in the 
context of the retreat of the welfare state, the creation of a market in care 
and cuts in public spending, local authority commissioning processes place 
severe competitive pressures on providers to deliver at lower prices. This 
emphasis on political economy avoids a technologically determinist 
approach (Howcroft and Taylor 2014) and the reference to case studies of 
authorities that have adopted UNISON’s Ethical Care Charter sug- gests 
that whilst ﬁnancial pressures have shaped implementation, there is a 
commitment to ensuring that care workers get paid a Living Wage and for 
travel time. Political and ﬁnancial commitment from council mem- bers 
(or in the case of Scotland, the government) in response to national and 
local trade union pressure appear to have made some difference. Here, EM 
was used more for the purpose of safeguarding and compliance and ethical 
care was generally considered incompatible with minute-by-minute 
commissioning. Signiﬁcantly, however, these case studies showed that the 
issue of working time and ZHCs is more intractable
3
 in the context of 
budgetary constraints that remove so-called ‘down-time’ or deﬁne 
elements of work as apparently ‘non-productive’; the ‘work-on-demand’ 
model. 
The state, in the form of local authorities, engages in third-party 
surveillance within the homecare employment relationship to beneﬁt 
from the extraction of unpaid labour from care workers. As Hayes and 
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Moore (2016) have suggested, EM communicates political suspicions that 
public money may be wasted in paying for care and has to be subject to 
stringent controls. This challenges the legitimacy of care as a public 
responsibility and plays into gendered expectations of women’s unpaid 
care labour. 
 
Notes 
 
1. The Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, described services 
as at a tipping point where social care was ‘in jeopardy’ (2016). The Chair 
of the Local Government Association (LGA), Lord Porter reported 
that social care faces a funding gap of at least £2.6 billion by 2020 and 
that councils would receive nearly one third (31%) less Revenue 
Support Grant to run local services in 2017/18 than 2016/17 (LGA, 
15/12/16). 
2. The National Minimum Wage in 2014. 
3. Some authorities have attempted to introduce Guaranteed Hours 
Contracts to move away from ZHCs, but early evidence suggests these are 
not ﬁxed-term contracts, but continue to be based upon workers being 
available to employer demands for variable working time. 
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